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 BANAL CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 
THE CASE OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN GREECE 
  
IOANNIS KALPOUZOS* AND ITAMAR MANN† 
In recent years, Greece has inflicted widespread inhuman and degrading treatment on asylum 
seekers. The European Union border agency Frontex has knowingly exposed asylum seekers to 
such treatment in Greek detention centres. This article argues that acts of Greek and Frontex 
agents may lead to individual responsibility for crimes against humanity under Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court arts 7(1)(e), (h) and (k). Investigation of such acts remains 
unlikely, not due to the relevant doctrine, but due to a popular imagination of crimes against 
humanity as radically evil acts. But international criminal law should not only aim to punish 
radically evil acts. Equally important is seemingly banal violence that appears as an inevitable 
by-product of global social and economic structures. Such is the violence currently wielded 
against asylum seekers. Confronting the latter category requires the International Criminal 
Court Prosecutor to realise the political nature of his or her judgement. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
‘[I]t is in the nature of a wrong not to be established by consensus’.1 
The International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) prosecutes spectacular examples of 
‘radical evil’.2 In such prosecutions political violence is paradigmatically 
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wielded for its own sake. But alongside these horrendous acts, there is another 
far less visible category of international crimes which also merits attention. Acts 
in this second category are normalised occurrences, understood as rooted in 
social and economic processes rather than in politics. Their perpetrators may be 
well-intentioned. But doctrinally, these banal acts fit within the ICC’s mandate, 
and their gravity should not be dismissed a priori as lesser than that of the 
radically evil acts the ICC has so far prosecuted.3 
The concrete example of such banal international crimes analysed below is 
violations of asylum seekers’ rights in Greece.4 While these practices are 
perceived as egregious in the context of human rights law (‘HRL’), they become 
banal in comparison with the radical evil that is often the subject of international 
criminal law (‘ICL’). HRL requires states to protect the rights of refugees and 
asylum seekers. Should ICL have a role in enforcing these rights by holding 
individuals accountable for flagrant cases of their violation?5 Rampant inhuman 
and degrading treatment (‘IDT’) of asylum seekers in detention centres around 
the world demands enquiry into such a doctrinal possibility. Such treatment is 
often recorded in developed states, where many of the detainees are migrants 
who clandestinely entered from the developing world. We chose to study Greece 
because it is at the fault lines between developed and developing worlds, and the 
main entry point to sought after migration destinations in the European Union. In 
such a setting, and for around a decade, migrants have been victims of 
particularly heinous HRL violations.6 
The legal category of crimes against humanity, widely seen as of central 
importance in ICL, allows the prosecution of IDT through the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.7 Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
2
 Hannah Arendt defined ‘radical evil’ as evil that makes human beings superfluous, reducing 
them to ‘bare life’, or life not worth living: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(Harvest, 1973) 459. See also Richard J Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question 
(Polity, 1996). For the development of the concept from Kant to Arendt, see Richard J 
Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Polity, 2002). On the notion of a 
spectacle generally, see G Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Black & Red, 2000). See 
Kamari Maxine Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the 
Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
15. In defence of the ‘spectacular’ aspect of international criminal justice, see also Mark 
Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (Transaction Publishers, 2000) 200. 
 
3
 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin, 2006) 
200. 
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 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), an asylum 
seeker is ‘someone who says he or she is a refugee’: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Asylum-Seekers (2015) <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html>. 
 
5
 For further reading on articles making related arguments to our own, see Jaya  
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International Criminal Law’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law Review 463; Sonja B 
Starr, ‘Exraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis 
Situations’ (2007) 101 Northwestern University Law Review 1257. 
 
6
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(‘Rome Statute’)8 maintains that ‘widespread’ ‘[i]mprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law’ constitutes a crime against humanity. Article 7(1)(h) criminalises the 
‘persecution’ of groups or collectivities and art 7(1)(k) further criminalises ‘other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’. As discussed in more 
detail below, the conditions under which asylum seekers are held in Greece 
appear to fulfil the definitions of these offences. Moreover, individual liability 
may attach not only to Greek officials, but also to employees of the EU’s border 
control agency Frontex deployed in Greek camps. 
However, the decision as to whether the ICC Prosecutor should investigate 
allegations of violations of asylum seekers’ rights in Greece is not only one of 
doctrine. It depends on a process of selection, central to which is the ‘gravity’ of 
the alleged crimes. The vagueness of the term, often criticised as problematic, 
reflects the political nature of the judgement as to which human rights violations 
are ‘grave’ enough to merit the Prosecutor’s attention.9 These judgements 
demand that the Prosecutor decide whose rights ICL prioritises. 
Our purpose here is to challenge the underlying assumptions that construct 
some actions as ‘radically evil’, and worthy of investigation, and others as 
‘banal’ in terms of ICL. We thus seek to correct the ICC’s prioritisation of 
radical evil over such banal crimes against humanity. Through correcting such 
harmful prioritisation we could also begin to address a deeper critique of ICL. In 
recent years, a growing body of critical scholarship has argued that the expansion 
of criminal prosecution, whether domestic or international, served powerful 
governments as a way of avoiding a real response to structural human rights 
violations.10 This argument is important. It largely focuses on the marginal effect 
— or even the legitimation effect — of singling out a necessarily limited number 
of ‘bad apples’ instead of addressing underlying socio-economic injustices.11 
This article offers a qualified response to the critique. Though this dynamic may 
in fact sometimes occur, there is nothing in criminal law doctrine that makes it 
inherently or necessarily true. Through an alternative critique internal to the 
discipline of ICL, we demonstrate how criminal prosecution can be employed to 
address structural human rights violations rooted in global socio-economic 
inequality. Clearly, ICL cannot provide a solution to such injustice, but it can, if 
 
8
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (‘Rome Statute’). 
 
9
 Samuel Moyn, ‘Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 4 Humanity 
473.  
 
10
 See Tor Krever, ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique’ (2013) 26 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 701. See also Christine Schwöbel (ed), Critical Approaches to 
International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2014); Vasuki Nesiah, ‘The Trials 
of History: Losing Justice in the Monstrous and the Banal’ in Ruth Buchanan and Peer 
Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice 
(Hart, 2014) 289. 
 
11
 This argument has indeed been extended beyond international criminal law (‘ICL’) to 
transitional justice. See Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” 
in Transitional Justice’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 266. 
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applied in good faith, be part of a larger necessary reorientation of international 
law towards such issues.12 
Finally, the analysis below admittedly invites a ‘flooding of the gates’ of the 
ICC with a large number of potential cases, which taken together may be beyond 
its institutional, as well as financial, capacity. Ignoring asylum seekers in Greece 
and in other regions, however, runs another risk. It reflects a legally unwarranted 
preference to defend the rights of some and not the rights of others. Indeed, such 
an approach constructs ICL as a law that, from the entire universe of prohibited 
acts falling under its doctrinal mandate, only criminalises those not committed 
by ‘Western’ states. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I (‘The Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Greece’) examines the situation of asylum 
seekers in Greece from the point of view of HRL. It surveys the widespread 
violations of asylum seekers’ rights and briefly introduces Frontex’s role in 
transferring asylum seekers to IDT in Greek detention facilities.13 
Part II (‘Crimes against Humanity’) provides the doctrinal backbone of the 
argument. It argues that the legal transition from human rights violations to 
international crimes can be supported by doctrine. It aims to concisely set out the 
contextual elements and specific prohibited acts, as well as offering brief 
observations on Frontex’s liability. This is an exercise limited to suggesting 
reasonable grounds justifying a preliminary investigation by the ICC Prosecutor. 
This paper’s necessary limits are even more pronounced with respect to the 
treatment of mens rea and selected avenues for individual liability: while we 
think it crucial to suggest that ‘banal’ crimes can be linked to particular 
individuals with particular intentions, the nature of a scholarly paper is not to 
prove and apportion individual guilt. 
Part III (‘Gravity’) situates our chosen case study in the debate surrounding 
gravity and lays out this article’s contribution to the theory of ICL. It suggests 
that, while so far the gravity test has tended towards a quantitative and 
spectacular orientation — that of mass atrocity or radically evil acts — this test 
requires qualitative judgement.14 Alongside investigating mass atrocity, the 
prosecutor should seek to investigate those crimes that fall under her legal 
mandate, but remain unacknowledged as grave violations of human rights. Banal 
international crimes are those whose gravity emanates precisely from the fact 
that they normally cannot be seen from the perspective of their victims. They are 
grave because the current world order somehow conceals their adverse 
consequences on the populations they target. 
In considering banal crimes against humanity, the Prosecutor’s judgement 
must take into account the desired political role of the ICC. In that context, the 
 
12
 Indeed, while this article focuses on the prioritisation by ICL of violations of civil and 
political rights embedded in global economic and social inequalities, scholarship can also 
focus on the criminalisation of the violation of economic and social rights. See Evelyn 
Schmid, Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Seriously in International Criminal 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
 
13
 Itamar Mann, ‘The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant 
Detainees in Greece’ (Report, Human Rights Watch, September 2011) 1 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/09/21/eu-s-dirty-hands-0> (‘HRW Report’). 
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 Judgement is Arendt’s antidote against ‘banal’ evil. See especially Hannah Arendt, 
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2015] The Case of Asylum Seekers in Greece 5 
 
Prosecutor should aim to prevent the possibility that international criminal 
prosecution will become a mode of domination of the rich and powerful against 
the poor and weak. Investigating violations of asylum seekers’ rights in Greece is 
only one of potentially numerous cases that may allow the ICC to realise a broad 
notion of complementarity: the Prosecutor aims to protect populations that no 
state is willing or able to protect. The case selection process should have no 
built-in preference for spectacular, radically evil crime. 
II THE INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 
GREECE 
Since the 2000s Greece has seen an increase in migration and arrests of 
irregular migrants.15 In recent years, international legal actors have repeatedly 
accused Greece of violations of asylum seekers’ rights. These violations date 
back at least to 2005. The most important findings came from the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). In a number of cases, the ECtHR has found 
that the treatment of asylum seekers in Greece reaches the level of IDT under 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) art 3.16 The principal case for 
the present purposes is MSS v Belgium (‘MSS’).17 The Court reviewed a vast 
array of reports by governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental 
organisations on the conditions in Greek migration detention centres.18 
The cumulative picture was alarming. Greek detention centres held migrants 
in extremely poor sanitary conditions, often in enormously overpopulated cells, 
with little or no access to medical services. The duration of incarceration in such 
conditions varied, but could be as short as a few hours and as long as over 18 
months.19 During such detention access to asylum is almost entirely non-
 
15
 See Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on His Mission to Greece (10–20 October 
2010), 16th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/16/52/Add.4 (21 April 2011) annex 9 [24]: ‘[I]n 2008, 
some 50 per cent of all arrests of aliens in the EU took place in Greece. This number has 
increased to 75 per cent in 2009 and almost 90 per cent in 2010’. This increase in irregular 
migrant arrivals has led to a national crisis within the Greek detention system. 
 
16
 See, eg, AA v Greece (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application 
No 12186/08, 22 July 2010); Rahimi v Greece (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, 
Application No 8687/08, 5 April 2011); RU v Greece (European Court of Human Rights, 
Chamber, Application No 2237/08, 7 June 2011); Mathloom v Greece (European Court of 
Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 48883/07, 24 April 2012); Mahmundi v Greece 
(European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 14902/10, 31 July 2012); 
Ahmade v Greece (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 50520/09, 
25 September 2012); AF v Greece (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, 
Application No 53709/11, 13 June 2013); Horshill v Greece (European Court of Human 
Rights, Chamber, Application No 70427/11, 1 August 2013); Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 
UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
 
17
 MSS v Belgium [2011] I Eur Court HR 255 (‘MSS’). 
 
18
 Among these were the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CPT’), the UNHCR, Amnesty International, 
Médecins Sans Frontières Greece (‘MSF’) and Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’). As the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) explained, the Greek Government did not 
dispute the factual findings of these reports: ibid 293 [159], 293–4 [160], 311 [229]. 
 
19
 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 [2008] OJ L 348/98 (‘Returns Directive’). Under art 15 of this Returns Directive, 
detention for the purpose of removal may not exceed 18 months. 
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existent. Few detainees are aware of their right to claim asylum,20 and some 
‘expressed fears that if they requested asylum, they would remain detained in 
such conditions for longer periods’.21 Moreover, detention can potentially be 
extended indefinitely, in the case of rejection of the asylum claim and refusal of 
the asylum seeker to be repatriated.22 This lack of access to asylum has led to 
numerous ECtHR judgments finding a violation of the individual’s right to 
effective remedies. In MSS the Court recounts numerous hurdles on access to 
protection under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,23 and 
consistent violations of the right to non-refoulement. 
In addition to the virtually complete lack of access to asylum and open-ended 
periods of detention, the inhumanity of the conditions has posed serious threats 
to the detainees’ physical and mental health. The cells have often been 
repurposed cement boxes designed originally for freight storage. They often 
lacked lighting, had little or no access to toilets, and mixed men, women and 
children of many nationalities.24 This sometimes resulted in complaints of rape, 
disease, hunger and sleep deprivation.25 In 2008, the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(‘CPT’) described the conditions in the Pagani detention centre in the island of 
Lesbos as ‘filthy beyond description’ and as a health hazard for staff and 
detainees alike.26 Here is a CPT description of another detention centre, in 2011: 
Police and border guard stations continued to hold ever greater numbers of 
migrants in even worse conditions. For example, at Soufli police and border guard 
station, in the Evros region, members of the Committee’s delegation had to walk 
over persons lying on the floor to access the detention facility. There were 146 
 
20
 According to the Council of Europe, ‘[t]he vast majority of detained persons … appeared to 
have no understanding of their legal situation’: Council of Europe, ‘Report to the Greek 
Government on the Visit to Greece Carried Out by the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 4 to 
16 April 2013’ (Report No CPT/Inf (2014) 26, 16 October 2014) 49 [88] (‘CPT Report 
2014’). 
 
21
 HRW Report, above n 13, 36. 
 
22
 This was the effect of Opinion No 44/2014 of the State Legal Council, adopted by the 
Interior Ministry and which extended detention beyond 18 months in such cases: State  
Legal Council, Opinion No 44/2014 <http://www.nsk.gov.gr/webnsk/gnwmodothsh.jsp? 
gnid=1868995>. This has now been found unlawful, by the judgment of the Administrative 
Court of First Instance of Athens: Administrative Court of First Instance (Athens), No 2255, 
23 May 2014 <http://infomobile.w2eu.net/tag/court-decision/>. 
 
23
 MSS [2011] I Eur Court HR 255, 54–64 [265]–[322]. 
 
24
 A large percentage of the intercepted migrants and asylum seekers fled from civil war, 
widespread persecution or risks of malnutrition. Eritreans, Iraqis, Somalis, Sudanese and 
Syrians have been some of the represented groups. Syrians in particular have appeared in 
particularly high numbers in recent years in Greece and are estimated to represent a quarter 
of the total number of unauthorised migrants. See Frontex, ‘Annual Risk  
Analysis’ (Report, 2014) 30 <http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/ 
Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf>. According to the CPT, ‘several Syrian nationals … had 
… been detained for periods of up to several months’: CPT Report 2014, above n 20, 36 
[60]. 
 
25
 HRW Report, above n 13. In 2001 an intercepted migrant was raped and tortured in 
detention by a member of the Greek Coast Guard. See Zontul v Greece (European Court of 
Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 12294/07, 17 January 2012). 
 
26
 Council of Europe, ‘Report to the Government of Greece on the Visit to Greece Carried Out 
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 17 to 29 September 2009’ (Report No CPT/inf (2010) 
33, 17 November 2010) 35 [64]. 
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irregular migrants crammed into a room of 110m2, with no access to outdoor 
exercise or any other possibility to move around and with only one functioning 
toilet and shower at their disposal; 65 of them had been held in these deplorable 
conditions for longer than four weeks and a number for longer than four months. 
They were not even permitted to change their clothes.27 
Around the same time, Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’) reported from a 
detention centre in the town of Fylakio that ‘[s]ewage was running on the floors, 
and the smell was hard to bear. Greek guards wore surgical masks when they 
entered the passageway between the large barred cells’.28 
The conditions in a small detention centre in the town of Igoumenitsa led the 
local court to acquit 15 detainees from the crime of escape from lawful custody29 
as the local court held that ‘they escaped to avoid a serious and unavoidable … 
danger [to] their health’.30 In other words, escape was an act of self-defence. 
Due to such conditions, these environments sometimes grew hopeless or even 
violent. At times migrants threw excrement to express their protest. In other 
instances migrants resorted to mass hunger strikes31 or sewed their mouths 
closed.32 Greek police sometimes quelled protest with anti-riot gear, including 
water-hosing and tear gas.33 In the MSS judgment, the ECtHR cited a 2007 report 
by CPT discussing frequent ill-treatment in Greek detention cells, including 
slaps, punches, kicks and blows with batons: ‘[i]n several cases, the delegation’s 
 
27
 Council of Europe, ‘European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT): Public Statement Concerning Greece’ 
(Statement No CPT/Inf (2011) 10, 15 March 2011) 3 [7] <http://www.cpt.coe.int/ 
documents/grc/2011-10-inf-eng.htm>. 
 
28
 HRW Report, above n 13, 3.  
 
29
 Penal Code (Greece) art 173. 
 
30
 Criminal Court of First Instance (Igoumenitsa), No 682/2012, 2 October 2012 
<https://revdh.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/tribunal-correctionnel-digoumenitsa-2-octobre-
2012.pdf> (unofficial UNHCR translation available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 
51b5d3536.html>). See also Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Greek Court Acquits Immigrants 
Who Escaped Appalling Detention Conditions’ on European Journal of International Law, 
EJIL: Talk! (12 January 2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/immigrants-who-escaped-appalling-
detention-conditions-acquitted/>. 
 
31
 The most recent one was initiated by 200 migrants at the time of writing this article: 
‘Greece: Migrants on Hunger Strikes at Corinth Detention Center’, ANSAmed (online), 13 
June 2014 <http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/generalnews/2014/06/ 
13/greecemigrants-on-hunger-strike-at-corinth-detention-center_5a87525d-cc3f-4b6c-a626 
-f4a0583f4a42.html>. Damian Mac Con Uladh, ‘Migrants on Hunger Strike at Corinth 
Detention Centre’, EnetEnglish (online), 12 June 2014 <http://www.enetenglish.gr/ 
?i=news.en.article&id=2008>: 
In an audio recording uploaded to YouTube by anti-racism group Keerfa, one of the 
protesters says detainees are being kept in deplorable conditions, suffer ill-treatment 
from police officers and guards and are being kept for more than 18 months in 
detention. The male voice says: We say ‘good morning’ and they [the police/guards] 
say ‘motherfucker, faggot’. We are human, too! We don’t have clean food nor clean 
water here ... nothing. We are human, not sheep ... It’s very difficult, we’ll continue 
this strike until we get out. If you don’t let us free, we will die inside ... If we don’t 
have that, we will stay inside to die … 
 
32
 Anna Giralt Gris, ‘On Location: Why Refugees to Greece are Sewing Their Mouths Shut’ 
on I Can’t Relax in Greece (24 February 2014) <http://icantrelaxingreece.wordpress.com/ 
2014/02/24/on-location-why-refugees-to-greece-are-sewing-their-mouths-shut/>. 
 
33
 Karolina Tagaris, ‘Greek Police Clash with Migrants at Detention Centre’, Reuters (online), 
23 November 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/23/us-greece-migrants-protest 
-idUSBRE8AM0KA20121123>. 
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doctors found that the allegations of ill-treatment by law enforcement officials 
were consistent with injuries displayed by the detained persons concerned’.34 
Similar incidents are reported in the CPT’s latest report.35 Greek immigration 
detention, explained Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
‘creates an environment of powerlessness for victims of physical abuse and may 
perpetuate a system of impunity for police violence’.36 As a recent Médecins 
Sans Frontières report exposed, the situation in Greek immigration detention 
centres has not significantly improved since.37 
The MSS judgment held that both Greece and Belgium were liable for 
violating ECHR art 3. Greece was liable because of the way asylum seekers were 
treated in its detention centres, but also because of the poor living conditions and 
the lack of access to effective remedies. Belgium violated ECHR art 3 because, 
while knowing of the horrendous situation asylum seekers are exposed to in 
Greece, it chose to deport the applicant to Greek territory. In doing so, Belgium 
acted under an EU regulation (‘the Dublin Regulation’),38 which allows EU 
states to deport asylum seekers to the first country they set foot in within the EU. 
The Court held that states were obliged to apply the Dublin Regulation only in 
accordance with asylum and HRL.39 The protection of fundamental rights allows 
the Court to cut through a network of multiple actors and prima facie 
incompatible legal obligations. It barred Belgium from ‘hiding’ behind a set of 
rules and actors without preforming its own judgement on the human rights 
implications at stake. 
The above suggests that the exposure of asylum seekers to IDT in Greek 
detention centres is not purely a Greek matter. The IDT of asylum seekers cannot 
be seen outside a European (Union) context. Indeed, Frontex border guards 
 
34
 MSS [2011] I Eur Court HR 255, 32 [163], quoting Council of Europe, ‘Report to the 
Government of Greece on the Visit to Greece Carried Out by the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 
20 to 27 February 2007’ (Report No CPT/Inf (2008) 3, 8 February 2008) 11 [13]. 
 
35
 CPT Report 2014, above n 20, 38 [64]. CPT Report 2014 notes that in some detention 
centres, ‘most police officers acted correctly’. In addition, ‘abusive and, at times, racist 
language … [was reported] in all the centres and holding facilities visited’. Detainees were 
also ‘handcuffed to the fence overnight … as punishment’, in some cases because they had 
committed self-harm.  
 
36
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak: Addendum — Mission to Greece, 16th sess, 
Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/16/52/Add 4 (21 April 2011) 1–2. 
 
37
 Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Invisible Suffering: Prolonged and Systematic Detention of 
Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Substandard Conditions in Greece’ (Report, 1 April 2014)  
<http://cdn.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/files/attachments/invisible_suffering.pdf> 
(‘Invisible Suffering’). The CPT Report 2013 confirms this: Council of Europe, ‘Report to 
the Government of Greece on the Visit to Greece Carried Out by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
from 4 to 16 April 2013’ (Report No CPT (2013) 35, 25 July 2013) 
<http://cm.greekhelsinki.gr/index.php?sec=192&cid=3858> (‘CPT Report 2013’). The 
Greek Government initially did not publicise it and only consented to do so after repeated 
requests from members of Parliament. The report is not available on the CPT website. The 
overall picture is more mixed in CPT Report 2014, where some improvement in some 
facilities was observed. See CPT Report 2014, above n 20, 29 [47].  
 
38
 Council Regulation No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 Establishing the Criteria and 
Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum 
Application Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National [2003] OJ L 
50/1. 
 
39
 MSS [2011] I Eur Court HR 255, 12–17 [62]–[87]. 
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knowingly transferred asylum seekers to to be subjected to IDT in Greek 
detention centres. Like Belgium, they too attempted to ‘hide’ behind a thick web 
of transnational mandates that purport to allow them to avoid liability.40 
On 10 October 2010, Frontex agents first arrived at the Greek border with 
Turkey, examining the possibility of a land deployment in the north-eastern 
region of Evros. High ranking officials toured the detention centres in the border 
region of Evros and saw the squalid conditions.41 By 2 November, 175 Frontex 
‘guest officers’ were deployed on the Greek–Turkish border, in a temporary 
emergency measure. The deployment was authorised under Regulation (EC) 
No 863/2007,42 giving the agency power to provide ‘Rapid Border Intervention 
Teams’. Thus, border guards from almost all other European member states 
patrolled in Greece, wearing their own national uniforms. 
The Rapid Border Intervention Teams shared the Greek Government’s border 
enforcement mission in a number of ways. The most relevant one is that Frontex 
border guards apprehended migrants on Greek territory, and transferred them to 
Greek detention facilities.43 Both high ranking Frontex officials and operational 
agents knew about IDT in the facilities they took migrants into.44 In at least one 
of the worst detention facilities the agency set up offices.45 
The MSS judgment was released at the height of Frontex’s emergency 
intervention in Greece. As the Court explained, Belgium violated the prohibition 
on IDT, by deporting one Afghan migrant to Greece, ‘knowingly exposing’ him 
to the possibility of ill-treatment in Greek detention facilities.46 The opinion 
could have changed Frontex’s actions, if Frontex officers would have felt they 
are put on notice for participating in IDT. During Frontex’s presence in Greece, 
many thousands of migrants were knowingly exposed to such treatment with the 
assistance of its agents or ‘guest officers’.47 
III CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
The extensive human suffering caused by the lack of access to asylum and the 
detention conditions imposed on asylum seekers is widely agreed to be IDT 
under HRL. It is another question whether these breaches of HRL amount to 
crimes against humanity.48 We attempt to provide an answer in this section.49 
 
40
 See Itamar Mann, ‘Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human 
Rights, 1993–2013’ (2013) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 315, 351–2.  
 
41
 HRW Report, above n 13, 20–3. 
 
42
 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and 
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as Regards that Mechanism and 
Regulating the Tasks and Powers of Guest Officers [2007] OJ L 199/30. 
 
43
 Ibid 2. 
 
44
 Ibid 23. 
 
45
 Ibid 32. 
 
46
 MSS [2011] I Eur Court HR 255, 343 [367]. 
 
47
 Between 2 November 2010 and 2 March 2011, nearly 12 000 migrants entering Greece at its 
land border with Turkey were arrested and detained. But this of course represents only a 
fraction of the phenomenon described here, which started much earlier and continues today, 
and spans over a larger part of the country. See HRW Report, above n 13, 48. 
 
48
 See more generally, Olivier de Frouville, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Case Law on International Criminal Law of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 633. 
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Even though ICL, as traditionally interpreted and applied, focuses on 
spectacular/radical evil and has not prioritised such cases, we aim to show that 
ICL does provide the necessary categories to articulate these and to suggest that 
there is reasonable ground to support a preliminary investigation in this case. 
This individual case study will contribute to the wider point: that social and 
economic crimes can be crimes against humanity with no necessary change to 
the Rome Statute; and that the ICC should generally give them more priority. 
A A Widespread and Systematic Attack Directed against Asylum Seekers 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute requires that crimes against humanity be 
‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’. 
The term ‘attack’ is associated with aggressive, even quasi-military, 
behaviour and may not seem fully compatible with a state’s reaction to migration 
flows. Confining the term ‘attack’ only to a military context reflects a radical evil 
or mass atrocity view of crimes against humanity, excluding ‘banal crimes’ such 
as the ones discussed here. However, doctrine indicates that the term has a wider 
scope. 
An ‘attack’ is a ‘course of conduct’, composed of policies, actions and 
omissions. This is supported by the Rome Statute,50 ICC case law,51 other courts 
and tribunals,52 as well as commentators.53 Such a non-military understanding of 
the term ‘attack’ is part of an extension or evolution of the category of crimes 
against humanity away from a necessary nexus with an armed conflict.54 What 
the notion of ‘attack’ requires is a multiplicity of acts, which, as a whole, 
constitute the attack. Such acts do not have to be exclusively ‘violent’ in the 
 
49
 See also Clare Henderson, ‘Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers: From Human Rights 
Violations to Crimes Against Humanity’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1161. 
 
50
 Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute states: ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts’. Such acts can, of course, be committed by omission. See, eg, Elies van 
Sliedregt, ‘Modes of Participation’ in Leyla Nadya Sadat (ed), Forging a Convention for 
Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 223, 228–230. 
 
51
 Most recently, see the analysis on what such a course of conduct may entail in: Prosecutor v 
Gbagbo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Laurent Gbagbo) (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014) [208]–[221] 
(‘Gbagbo PTC’). 
 
52
 See, eg, Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997) [644] (‘Tadić 
TC’); Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial 
Chamber I, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998) [581] (‘Akayesu TC’); Prosecutor v 
Taylor (Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03 
-01-T, 18 May 2012) [506]: ‘[a]n “attack” … may encompass any mistreatment of any 
civilian population’. 
 
53
 See Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 91. Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta speaks of a ‘practice 
that either forms part of a policy by a government, a de facto political authority, or an 
organized political group, or is tolerated, condoned, or acquiesced in by the 
aforementioned’. See also Schmid, above n 12, 77–80. 
 
54
 The nexus is not required in the Rome Statute. For the position in custom, see Tadić TC, 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-94 
-1-T, 7 May 1997) [627]. 
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strictest, physical, sense of the term.55 As the elements of crimes against 
humanity stipulate, what is required is ‘the multiple commission of acts referred 
to in article 7, paragraph 1’,56 namely the prohibited acts discussed below.57 
These may range from acts of physical violence, eg beatings, to the subjection of 
individuals to certain physical conditions,58 to persecution and to the legislative 
and administrative measures59 establishing, maintaining and, therefore, 
constituting the overall attack. These are the acts, described above, which 
constitute Greece’s detention policy. They include the acts of individuals 
working in the detention centres, providing the necessary administrative and 
political decision-making, and establishing the relevant legal/institutional 
framework. To the extent that these acts, which are part of the overall detention 
policy, expose asylum seekers to IDT, while denying them any actual recourse in 
challenging the legality of their detention, they can only be seen as ‘a course of 
conduct involving the commission of acts of violence’.60 Finally, and crucially, 
in order to see the state’s detention policy as (containing) an ‘attack’ it is not 
necessary that every single aspect of it and every individual act associated with it 
is a prohibited act. It is sufficient to identify IDT and denial of detention review 
as inherent and systematic features of said detention policy, as the ECtHR, 
indeed, repeatedly has.61 The fact that this line of conduct constitutes and is 
contained in what is prima facie a state’s overall right to manage immigration 
flows does not preclude it of the character of attack, even though it contributes to 
its perception as ‘banal’. 
This multiplicity of acts provides the necessary ‘scale’. Both this and the 
necessary ‘minimal level of collectivity’,62 which is required through the ‘state 
 
55
 In this sense the statement in Prosecutor v Kaing requiring ‘the multiple commission of acts 
of violence’ can be seen as misleading: Prosecutor v Kaing (Judgment) (Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Trial Chamber (ECC), Case No 001/18-07 
-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010) [298].  
 
56
 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Addendum 2, 
UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2 November 2000) 9 (‘ICC Elements of Crimes’). See also 
at 9 [3], 9 n 6, which clarifies that ‘[s]uch a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be 
implemented by a deliberate failure to take action’. 
 
57
 See also Prosecutor v Bemba (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009) [75] 
(‘Bemba PTC’): ‘[t]he commission of the acts referred to in article 7(1) of the Rome Statute 
constitute the “attack” itself and, beside the commission of the acts, no additional 
requirement for the existence of an “attack” should be proven’. 
 
58
 According to Prosecutor v Kunarac, ‘[i]t is sufficient to show that the act took place in the 
context of an accumulation of acts of violence which, individually, may vary greatly in 
nature and gravity’: Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, Case No IT-96-23-T, 22 February 2001) [419]. 
 
59
 See also William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the 
Rome Statute (Oxford University Press, 2010) 153. 
 
60
 Prosecutor v Naletilić (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-98-34-T, 31 March 2003) [233]. 
 
61
 In this context the distinction drawn by the recent ECtHR Grand Chamber decision in 
Tarakhel v Switzerland between the likelihood of inhumane treatment for the specific 
applicants in Italy with the overall conditions in Greece (in the context of the MSS 
judgment), justifying a blanket ban on expulsion, is telling. See Tarakhel v Switzerland 
(European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 29217/12, 4 November 
2014) [101]. 
 
62
 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2014) 236. 
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or organisational policy’ criterion of Rome Statute art 7(2)(a), are satisfied. The 
conditions of detention and the lack of procedural safeguards do not constitute 
random and isolated acts. The ascription of responsibility for inflicting IDT to 
Greece by the ECtHR, and the finding in MSS that the infliction of IDT on 
asylum seekers in Greece is generalised to the extent that it justifies a blanket 
ban on deportation to Greece, clearly suggests that such a course of action 
consists of a multiplicity of acts united by a thread and is attributable, as policy, 
to the state and its agents. 
This ‘attack’ is directed against a great number of people who, by virtue of 
their status, form a vulnerable collectivity. Indeed, the meaning of the ‘civilian’ 
nature of the victim is not limited to relevant distinctions in armed conflict.63 
The concept requires an element of multitude64 and a feature which identifies 
them as a collectivity and distinguishes them from the attacker.65 Together with 
the understanding of the ‘attack’ as containing a multitude of acts mounted by a 
(state) organisation, the structure created is one of a vulnerable collectivity 
subject to crimes committed by a powerful organisation. This is in accordance 
with a well-established legal66 and philosophical67 understanding of crimes 
against humanity, which highlights the disparity of power between the attacking 
and attacked collectivities. The vulnerability, multitude and geographical 
delimitation of detained asylum seekers seems to unfortunately fit this paradigm. 
 
63
 However, such distinctions still play a role over the interpretation of both ‘civilian’ and 
‘directed’. Discussing especially the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) case law, see Göran Sluiter, ‘“Chapeau Elements” of Crimes Against 
Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the UN Ad Hoc Tribunals’ in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed), 
Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
102, 117–20. 
 
64
 Importantly, not all members of the civilian population in the geographical entity need to be 
targeted. See Tadić v Prosecutor (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) [305] (‘Tadić AC’); 
Kunarac v Prosecutor (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case Nos IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002) [90]; 
Blaškić v Prosecutor (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004) [105] (‘Blaškić AC’). 
This means that the existence of detention facilities less exposed to prohibited acts does not 
negate the overall attack on asylum seekers. 
 
65
 The distinction is purely meant to delineate them as the attacked collectivity and does not 
need to be based on any racial, ethnic, religious or national characteristics. See Prosecutor v 
Katanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008) [399] (‘Katanga PTC’). The 
‘civilian population’ can also be identified through their geographical position, either in 
terms of where they are crossing or where they are detained. See Prosecutor v Semanza 
(Judgement and Sentence) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber III, 
Case No ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003) [330] (‘Semanza TC’). 
 
66
 See M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary 
Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) ch 1. See a challenge to this understanding 
in: Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) (International 
Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014)  
[1117]–[1122]; and criticism in Judge Van den Wyngaert’s dissenting opinion: Prosecutor v 
Katanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute) (International Criminal Court, 
Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-AnxI, 7 March 2014) [269] (Judge Van 
den Wyngaert). 
 
67
 See David Luban, ‘A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of 
International Law 85; Richard Vernon, ‘What is Crime Against Humanity?’ (2002) 10 
Journal of Political Philosophy 231. 
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Finally, the ‘attack’ needs to be ‘widespread or systematic’. The test is 
disjunctive and either criterion can be met. A ‘systematic’ attack has been 
variously defined as requiring organisation, patterns of behaviour68 and the 
existence of a common policy formulated at a high level.69 A state’s asylum 
policy, dysfunctional as it may be, clearly qualifies. The implication of high level 
authorities, including the state’s interior ministry, and EU agencies, the use of 
significant resources70 and the extensive legalisation, bureaucratisation and 
institutionalisation of the asylum regime — again, despite its ultimate 
dysfunction — indicate that this is not a random set of isolated acts;71 it is a 
systematic policy.72 
The attack is also ‘widespread’. This is widely perceived to be referring to the 
scale of the violations and the numbers of individuals affected.73 While a 
pedantic ‘numbers game’ should be avoided, the scale of violations is 
acknowledged and emphasised by the authorities cited in the previous section. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is the dramatic result of the MSS judgment, 
which led most EU states to stop transferring migrants and asylum seekers to 
Greece.74 The fact that the applicant to ECtHR was exposed to IDT in Greece 
was not considered to be a mere coincidence. Rather, there was a high 
probability that any asylum seeker that would reach Greece would be exposed to 
IDT. This high probability provides prima facie evidence that IDT was 
‘widespread’ for the purpose of art 7 of the Rome Statute as well. Indeed, IDT of 
asylum seekers in Greece has been ongoing for nearly a decade, and has now 
affected thousands of victims.75 
In conclusion, the state’s detention policy entails the exposure of asylum 
seekers to IDT through a multiplicity of acts, which constitute a widespread and 
 
68
 See Kunarac TC (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 
II, Case No IT-96-23-T, 22 February 2001) [429]. 
 
69
 See, for example, the definition in: Akayesu TC (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998) [580]. 
 
70
 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000) [203] (‘Blaškić TC’). 
 
71
 The International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) has rightly emphasised this, most recently in 
Gbagbo PTC: Gbagbo PTC (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No 
ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014) [223]. See also Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) 
(International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 
2009) [81] (‘Al Bashir PTC’). 
 
72
 MSF argued that Greek detention centres ‘systematically’ expose asylum seekers to 
substandard detention conditions: Invisible Suffering, above n 37. 
 
73
 See Gbagbo PTC (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No  
ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014) [222]; Al Bashir PTC (International Criminal Court,  
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009) [81]. 
 
74
 For the list of states, see w2eu.info, Deportations to Greece Are Stopped in Most Countries 
of the EU (April 2012) <http://www.w2eu.info/dublin2.en/articles/deportationstop-greece. 
en.html>. 
 
75
 The latest available number is from April 2014, when MSF estimated that 6000 migrants 
were held in regular detention, and perhaps several thousand more were apprehended in 
police stations: Invisible Suffering, above n 37, 7. While exact figures are unavailable, 
individuals affected in the last decade number in tens, maybe hundreds of thousands.  
For an overview, see Global Detention Project, Greece Detention Profile (April 2014) 
<http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/greece/introduction.html>. 
                                                 
14 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 16 
 
systematic attack against a vulnerable collectivity. This elevates the prohibited 
acts described below to the category of crimes against humanity. 
B Through Unlawful Imprisonment, Persecution and Other Inhumane Acts 
While varied and partially open-ended, the prohibited acts within the 
definition of crimes against humanity are meant to capture a level of 
egregiousness that justifies international prosecution. Extant doctrine allows the 
application of these categories for the protection of asylum seekers, particularly 
Rome Statute arts 7(1)(e) (‘Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law’); 7(1)(h) 
(‘Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender … or other grounds that are 
universally recognised as impermissible under international law’); and 7(1)(k) 
(‘Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’). 
1 Imprisonment 
Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute applies either to imprisonment, or to any 
deprivation of liberty of similar severity. This suggests that various forms of 
incarceration — including immigration detention — are within the ICC’s scope 
of review to the extent that they are of ‘severity’ similar to ‘imprisonment’ and in 
violation of ‘fundamental rules of international law’. 
There is little doubt that the deprivation of liberty of asylum seekers is 
‘severe’, both in terms of its duration and in terms of the specific conditions of 
imprisonment. The duration often measures in months and may even qualify as 
indefinite.76 The detention facilities are of a strictly speaking carceral nature, 
rendering the deprivation of liberty as comprehensive as that experienced in 
prison facilities. This is the case both in specifically purposed immigration 
detention centres described above and in the context of detention in police 
stations, which are at the very centre of the concept of ‘imprisonment’. The 
severity of the deprivation of liberty is accentuated, and reflected, in the often 
complete lack of access to outside space.77 Indeed, the inhumanity of the 
conditions of detention, while not strictly associated in ICL jurisprudence with 
this specific prohibited act, may be seen to exacerbate the severity of the 
deprivation of liberty. 
Does the incarceration of asylum seekers in Greece violate ‘fundamental 
rules’ of international law, as per art 7(1)(e)? The dominant interpretation of 
‘fundamental rules’ has so far focused on procedure. Accordingly, 
‘imprisonment’ as a crime against humanity entails a severe deprivation of 
 
76
 See above nn 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 
77
 See above nn 21, 23, 26 and accompanying text. 
                                                 
2015] The Case of Asylum Seekers in Greece 15 
 
liberty without due process.78 According to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) ‘imprisonment … should be understood as 
[contemplating] arbitrary imprisonment, that is to say, the deprivation of liberty 
of the individual without due process of law’.79 
Significantly, the legality of detention will be assessed not under domestic 
law, but under international law.80 Here ICL is referring to egregious violations 
of HRL,81 specifically the right to a fair trial as it applies to administrative 
decisions leading to detention (and subsequent access to asylum). These can be 
found both in specialised systems, such as the EU regulations on access to 
asylum, in regional systems, such as the ECHR, in international systems, such as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in customary 
international law.82 According to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
there is arbitrary detention  
 
78
 On the conditions of imprisonment ICL literature supports the view that ‘[a]nother category 
which may constitute arbitrary detention is when the conditions of detention themselves 
amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’. See Christopher K Hall, 
‘Article 7 Crimes against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (C H Beck, 
2nd ed, 2008) 159, 201 [38]. Indeed, the text of the Rome Statute can be seen as supporting 
this approach. This would also reflect the concept of ‘arbitrariness’ in human rights law. See 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of 
Person), 112th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35 (16 December 2014) 4 [14] (‘General 
Comment No 35’). ‘[D]etention may be arbitrary if the manner in which the detainees are 
treated does not relate to the purpose for which they are ostensibly being detained’. 
Nevertheless, the narrower focus of ICL jurisprudence on procedural arbitrariness is 
followed here, and the inhumanity of conditions is considered further below. 
 
79
 Prosecutor v Kordić (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001) [302], affd Kordić v 
Prosecutor (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004) [116]. While the 
ICC has charged an accused with the crime, it has not yet developed its jurisprudence. See 
count 34 in: Prosecutor v Harun (Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun) (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Case No ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007) 12. 
 
80
 Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, Case No IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002) [114] (‘Krnojelac 
TC’). Most recently, see Prosecutor v Stanišić (Judgement: Volume 1 of 3) (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, Case No IT-08-91-T, 27 
March 2013) [79]. 
 
81
 Although, it may also refer to the law of armed conflict, specifically the law of occupation. 
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 
August 12, 1949, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 
October 1950) arts 42–3. 
 
82
 For a breakdown of principles on justification, duration and reviewability of detention, see 
Michael Fordham, Justine N Stefanelli and Sophie Eser, Immigration Detention and the 
Rule of Law: Safeguarding Principles (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2013).  
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[w]hen the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to 
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
… is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character.83 
Specifically, the detention of asylum seekers beyond ‘a brief initial period in 
order to document their entry’ and ‘in the absence of particular reasons specific 
to the individual, such as an individualised likelihood of absconding, a danger of 
crimes against others or a risk of acts against national security’ as well as without 
‘periodic re-evaluation and judicial review’ is arbitrary.84 ‘The inability of a 
[s]tate party to carry out the expulsion of an individual because of statelessness 
or other obstacles does not justify indefinite detention’.85 The continuing 
potential for arbitrariness is reflected in ICL jurisprudence, which stipulates that 
the absence of the possibility to review the legality of detention is also crucial as 
‘[i]f at any time the initial legal basis ceases to apply, the initially lawful 
deprivation of liberty may become unlawful at that time and be regarded as 
arbitrary imprisonment’.86 
Indeed, both the ECtHR and numerous reports87 have expounded on the 
complete breakdown of the access to asylum system both within and outside 
detention centres in Greece. 
2 Persecution 
The legal bases discussed above reflect how ICL can articulate and address 
both the arbitrariness and the conditions of the detention of asylum seekers in 
Greece. These facts, however, can be further encompassed in a wider category of 
ICL, which better reflects the fact that the treatment of asylum seekers is 
ultimately the product of active discrimination, rather than an inadequate 
reaction to immigration flows, due perhaps to insufficient funds.88 The crime of 
persecution is traditionally used to describe (legal) regimes of widespread human 
rights violations on discriminatory grounds against individuals who are 
perceived as ‘foreign bodies’. It is an umbrella concept, the openness of which 
 
83
 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons 
Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment: Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, UN GAOR, 44th sess, Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1998/44 (19 December 1997) annex 1 16–17 [8(c)]. This document has been widely 
quoted by international criminal tribunals as authoritative. See Krnojelac TC for other 
procedural standards references as well: Krnojelac TC (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, Case No IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002) [113]. This 
approach is further and most recently developed in: General Comment No 35, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/35, 3–8 [10]–[23]. 
 
84
 General Comment No 35, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35, 5–6 [18]. 
 
85
 Ibid (footnote omitted). 
 
86
 Krnojelac TC (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, 
Case No IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002) [114]. 
 
87
 See above nn 16–19 and accompanying text. 
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 This is one argument/excuse commonly employed by officials in the public discourse. See 
Leonidas K Cheliotis, ‘Behind the Veil of Philoxenia: The Politics of Immigration Detention 
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needs to be balanced by containing acts clearly defined89 and of similar gravity 
to other prohibited acts,90 lest the principle of legality be unacceptably stretched 
(see also with regard to ‘other inhumane acts’ below). 
Persecution can be seen as a microcosm of the overall structure of the concept 
of crimes against humanity. Accordingly, it needs to be committed through 
specific acts, subsumed under the general concept. These can either be physical 
acts, or indeed the legislative and administrative acts necessary for establishing 
the discriminatory treatment.91 Moreover, acts charged under persecution may 
have also been part of the charges under other prohibited acts.92 Indeed, 
persecutory acts can fall under either of two categories:93 acts which would fulfil 
the criteria of other war crimes, acts of genocide or crimes against humanity; and 
‘behaviors that do not in themselves satisfy the listed definitions’.94 Specifically, 
both the ICTY and the ICC have determined that ‘serious bodily and mental 
harm and infringements upon individual freedom may be characterised as 
persecution’.95 The analysis above is therefore also applicable here. 
What is required further, however, is that the persecutory acts, ‘rather than the 
attack in general’,96 are committed against ‘any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender … or other 
grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international 
law’. 
While asylum seekers, as a collectivity, might not prima facie satisfy the 
enumerated categories, such an interpretation is possible and may find support in 
ICL jurisprudence. One such approach would stand on a wide interpretation of 
‘political’ grounds. While there are cases of narrow interpretation of ‘political 
grounds’,97 ‘other jurisprudence has found that political persecution occurred 
where discrimination has been effected pursuant to political motivations or a 
 
89
 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000) [618] (‘Kupreškić TC’). 
 
90
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acts ‘must be evaluated not in isolation but in context, by looking at their cumulative effect’: 
at [622]. Although individual acts may not be inhumane, their overall consequences must 
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-1-T, 7 May 1997) [703]–[710]. 
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Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11, 23 January 2012) [271]. 
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Criminal Law (TMC Asser, 2005) 255–7 [741]–[743]. 
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TC (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT 
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political agenda against a group which itself may not hold any political views’.98 
Seeing the establishment of certain conditions of detention as a reflection and 
consequence of the perception of asylum seekers as unwanted foreign bodies, the 
flows of which need to be managed, deterred and reversed, does entail ascribing 
them a certain political status. Official statements linking the conditions of 
detention to their aspired deterrent effect may exemplify such discriminatory 
animus.99 The political grounds leading to the infliction of widespread human 
rights violations are in the eye of the persecutor. 
Alternatively, other universally impermissible grounds could contain ‘social 
grounds’,100 although such an interpretation of art 7(1)(h) would not be 
uncontroversial.101 Finally, in the context of comparable treatment of asylum 
seekers in Australia, the case has been made that HRL provides sufficient 
support for the universal impermissibility of discriminating on the basis of ‘mode 
of arrival’.102 
3 Other Inhumane Acts 
The category of other inhumane acts occupies a pivotal spot in the legal and 
conceptual architecture of crimes against humanity. Its role has always been to 
capture acts of similar gravity and severity to the other prohibited acts. It reflects 
the dynamic and, for this very reason, potentially problematic nature of a legal 
regime that seeks to expand its sanctions and therefore threatens the strict 
principle of legality in ICL.103 For this reason ‘this residual category … must be 
interpreted conservatively and must not be used to expand uncritically the scope 
of crimes against humanity’.104 
Nevertheless, the category can be used to describe and capture acts and 
conditions that constitute ‘serious violations of international customary law and 
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 Prosecutor v Nuon (Case 002/01 Judgement) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Trial Chamber I, Case No 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 7 August 2014) [430] 
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the basic rights pertaining to human beings’105 and lead to significant physical 
and mental suffering, as observed in detention centres. Courts and tribunals have 
used this category to capture a variety of acts as long as there was  
(i) the occurrence of an act or omission of similar seriousness to the other 
enumerated acts under the Article; (ii) the act or omission caused serious mental 
or physical suffering or injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity.106  
The circumstance, including the age of the victims, their health and the 
physical, moral and mental effects of IDT on victims are crucial.107 ‘Serious’ and 
‘systematic’ levels of IDT have expressly been recognised as qualifying as other 
‘inhumane acts’.108 The same applies to overcrowding of cells, absence of 
bedding and basic hygiene, leading to lice and other diseases.109 The deprivation 
of ‘adequate food, shelter, medical assistance, and minimum sanitary 
conditions’, has also been found to qualify.110 So have beatings, ‘physical and 
psychological abuse and intimidation, inhumane treatment, and depriv[ation] of 
adequate food and water’.111 The conditions described above, and their 
widespread and systematic occurrence, fit the pattern, as do the physical and 
mental consequences on the victims. An investigation may further determine the 
gravity of such inhumane conditions, as well as the extent to which incidents of 
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 Katanga PTC (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 
30 September 2008) [448]. 
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 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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Blagojević (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial 
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Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003) [153]. 
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 Krnojelac TC (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, 
Case No IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002) [135]–[136]. It may be debated what exactly 
constitutes, as in Krnojelac TC, a deliberate policy of overcrowding. The judgment doesn't 
state whether each of the described conditions, or each set of conditions, by themselves 
qualify as other inhumane acts. At [144]: 
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the physical and psychological health of many 
non-Serb detainees deteriorated or was destroyed as a result of the living conditions 
accepted as having existed at the KP Dom ... In making this finding, the Trial 
Chamber notes that there is no legal requirement that the suffering of a victim be 
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beatings and sexual violence112 can be characterised as an inherent part of the 
detention system,113 or divergent behaviour of specific individuals. 
4 Some Observations on Mens Rea 
While it is impossible in this context to conclusively diagnose the mental state 
of potential individual suspects, certain observations on mens rea are relevant to 
the distinction between banal and radical evil crimes. A useful focus may be 
placed on border guards, employees both of the Greek state and Frontex, either 
holding or transferring asylum seekers to facilities that inflict IDT. In interviews 
conducted with them,114 many expressed understanding, and even some measure 
of regret, that asylum seekers suffered IDT. We assume these people did not 
want asylum seekers to be exposed to IDT. Their role was simply to be part of an 
overall policy, described above in ICL terms. Both the Rome Statute115 and ICL 
jurisprudence116 are satisfied with the perpetrators’ knowledge/awareness that 
their acts or omissions will lead to the specific result. Both Greek and Frontex 
agents testified to have being aware that IDT occurred in Greek immigration 
detention centres, and that, therefore, this would be the consequence of their 
actions ‘in the ordinary course of events’.117 Indeed, their placement in close 
proximity to these events could not have allowed them to remain oblivious to 
these consequences, even if they so preferred. 
There is a question whether the same test for mens rea applies for ‘other 
inhumane acts’, since art 7(1)(k) requires the acts to ‘intentionally caus[e]’ the 
suffering. It may be argued that the detention conditions, deplorable and 
inhumane as they are, are not intended to cause the physical and mental suffering 
and injury they do. The regret the interviewed actors felt would therefore 
effectively shield them. Here we see, in the lex lata, a reflection of the distinction 
between banal and radically evil acts, potentially distinguishing between sadistic 
infliction of suffering and simple participation in a degrading system. However, 
the elements of crimes do not seem to suggest that a mens rea threshold, higher 
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than the one in art 30(2) discussed above, is imposed here.118 Awareness of the 
consequences of the action suffices,119 and the position of guards guarantees 
such awareness. Beyond this, and to the extent that dolus directus would be 
necessary,120 we suggest it worth determining the extent to which the entire 
detention system assumes a punitive character by identifying migration and 
asylum seeking as a threat, to be punished through inhumane detention 
conditions. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that such a punitive mindset is 
present in centres of crucial authority.121 This is fertile ground, at least, for a 
preliminary investigation. 
One further complication with regard to the mens rea threshold exists in the 
context of the need for a discriminatory animus for persecution. Knowledge of 
discriminatory overall policy is not enough. While this may prove problematic 
for individual detention facility guards, such a hurdle might be easier to 
overcome in the case of individuals associated with the establishment of the 
overall institutional and administrative discriminatory state.122 
C With the Complicity of Frontex 
ICL requires placing the focus on individuals and their link to the inhumane 
consequences of their actions. The law provides the tools to address the 
responsibility of individuals physically proximate to the detention facilities and 
the inflicted IDT as well as the responsibility of those who, while physically 
removed, play an important role in constituting and participating in the ‘attack’. 
This could include individuals who serve as guards as well as those in crucial 
positions in the political and/or police apparatus. We cannot, in this space, 
provide a roll call of potential defendants. As with the discussion of mens rea, a 
doctrinal analysis does not lend itself to proving the criminal responsibility of an 
 
118
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individual or a set of individuals. It will be up to the Prosecutor to determine 
‘who bear[s] the greatest responsibility’.123 
We must, nevertheless, offer some brief observations on the role of Frontex 
and its agents. This is partly because, as set out above,124 the IDT of asylum 
seekers in Greece can only be seen as an EU phenomenon. Excluding non-Greek 
state agents would mean limiting the blame to the relatively weaker actor. 
Moreover, conceptually, the implication of an EU agency visibly illustrates the 
complexity, bureaucratisation and multi-level functioning of systems of banal 
criminality. We thus tentatively indicate some avenues that ICL doctrine 
provides us in order to link individuals to the consequences of their actions. 
Frontex’s role, as discussed above, has been focused on patrolling, providing 
assistance to Greek border guards and transferring migrants to Greek custody. 
The detention of asylum seekers in camps, in the interests of Greek and EU 
immigration policy, can be seen as a ‘common plan’. The idea of a ‘common 
plan’, to which perpetrators (associated with either the Greek state or Frontex) 
are contributing is central in the principle of co-perpetration, according to Rome 
Statute art 25(3)(a).125 Approaching Greek and EU collaboration as a ‘common 
plan’ may also allow the ICC Prosecutor, following the focus of ICC 
jurisprudence,126 to address the potential liability of individuals at higher levels 
of decision making.127 The oft quoted dictum of the Prosecutor v Lubanga  
Pre-Trial Chamber has set out the combined subjective/objective approach which 
confirms that principal liability  
is not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the 
offence, but also include[s] those who, in spite of being removed from the scene 
of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether 
and how the offence will be committed.128 
Crucially, the plan itself does not have to be criminal: 
It suffices … that the co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing 
the common plan (which is specifically directed at the achievement of a  
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non-criminal goal) will result in the commission of the crime, and (b) accept such 
an outcome.129 
Even if we accept that IDT is not the ultimate goal, the ECtHR case law has 
shown that it is a necessary consequence of the ‘plan’, as executed. The 
perpetrators are also, at least, fully aware of the risk that implementing the 
common plan will result in the commission of the crime and, by their actions, 
have accepted the outcome. Finally, it can be argued that Frontex and the Greek 
state have joint control over the plan and are both able ‘to frustrate the 
commission of the crime by not performing the assigned functions’.130 Put 
differently, Frontex’s role, including in transferring individuals, provides an 
‘essential’ contribution to this plan.131 
Even if principal liability cannot be successfully constructed, Frontex’s role 
can be described as ‘aiding and abetting’. The combination of the level of the 
contribution, having ‘a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime’, 
with the knowledge132 of the detention conditions,133 satisfies accessory liability 
in accordance with Rome Statute art 25(3)(c).134 Article 25(3)(c) requires the aid 
to be given ‘for the purpose of facilitating the crime’,135 an element that may 
complicate attribution, raising once more the issue of the extent of the integration 
of the criminal and non-criminal aspects of detention.136 On this, we can only 
agree with Robert Cryer’s recommendation137 that the ICC follows the principle 
of Tadić v Prosecutor, namely that ‘awareness … of the essential elements of the 
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crime committed by the principal would suffice’.138 Finally, the fact that ‘the 
lending of practical assistance … may occur before [the] offence occurs’,139 
seems to adequately describe Frontex’s role in handing over individuals to be 
detained in the described conditions. 
IV GRAVITY 
Even if we have outlined a prima facie case so as to satisfy the requirement in 
Rome Statute art 53(1)(a) that the available information provides a ‘reasonable 
basis’ for prosecution, we must also show that the crimes committed in Greek 
detention centres are of sufficient gravity to warrant investigation by the ICC 
Prosecutor. This requirement constitutes another stumbling block for the project 
of extending crimes against humanity to include banal acts as well as radically 
evil ones. As explained above, banal acts are normalised occurrences, understood 
as rooted in social and economic process rather than in politics. Their 
perpetrators may be ‘well-intentioned’, as Greek and Frontex border guards may 
have been in attempting to prevent unauthorised migration into Greece. As we 
have shown, these banal acts fit within the ICC’s mandate. 
While radically evil crimes clearly amount to grave crimes, banal acts are  
— of their nature — less obviously grave. For this reason,140 we suggest a 
different interpretation of ‘gravity’, demonstrating that banal crimes can 
nonetheless be sufficiently serious to warrant investigation. The term ‘gravity’ is 
laid out, undefined, in Rome Statute arts 17(1)(c) and 53(1)(c). The concept of 
‘gravity’ combines the necessity of definition with the flexibility of prosecutorial 
policy. The ensuing vagueness is both a blessing and a curse: while it provides a 
criterion for selection, it also invites charges of selectivity, affecting the 
perceived legitimacy of the Court. 
The Prosecutor’s approach so far has been to interpret gravity as meaning one 
thing: ‘mass atrocities’.141 Within this framework, one might agree that the 
detention of asylum seekers in Greece is deplorable and even merits 
humanitarian response. But it pales in comparison with other cases the ICC has 
so far taken on. The situations in the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, the Republic of Kenya and 
Uganda all involved spectacular acts of human destruction. As one commentator 
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put it, the defendant in such cases figures as ‘an ogre forever bent on the 
consumption of humans’.142 Suspects currently facing prosecution at the ICC 
have all intentionally engaged in attacks on civilian population involving 
massacre, rape, torture, tyrannical rule or a combination of the above. There are 
sound reasons for international prosecution of mass atrocities. Yet the Court 
docket has, in recent years, provoked considerable criticism, according to which 
its cases inappropriately target African countries.143 Such criticisms must raise 
the basic question: do the Court’s cases reflect a valid understanding of 
‘gravity’? 
We believe the hierarchy between the banal and the spectacular, and in fact 
the disregard of the former category altogether, must be reconsidered. 
Confronting acts that seem to be natural by-products of global social and 
economic process may allow the Court to more seriously address contemporary 
criticisms of its case selection. This is imperative, if the Court’s case selection is 
to realise a universalist vision of politics. The analysis above with respect to 
asylum seekers in Greece is merely one of a potentially much larger set of 
circumstances constitutive of banal crimes against humanity. Many of these may 
potentially trigger prosecution against developed countries. 
To be sure, the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) itself has started to develop a 
flexible approach, rejecting ‘an overly restrictive legal bar to the interpretation of 
gravity that would hamper the deterrent role of the Court’.144 It called for ‘both 
quantitative and qualitative considerations’, including the scale, nature, manner 
of commission and impact of the crimes.145 This open-endedness has been 
criticised as opening the ICC to accusations of ‘politicisation’.146 Such  
open-endedness, however, should recalibrate prosecutorial policy away from an 
exclusive focus on the spectacular. More pointedly, some politicisation is both 
inevitable and necessary if the OTP is to develop a coherent understanding of its 
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role as an institution of universal criminal justice.147 Meting out justice, on this 
account, is an inherently political task,148 as is any understanding of what it 
means to be universal. 
Kevin Heller has already argued for a qualitative focus, based on three central 
considerations: the centrality of the state, the high level of systematisation of the 
conduct and the potential for ‘social alarm’. The latter term ‘is a function of how 
widely a crime is committed’,149 a notion adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
the context of the use of child soldiers.150 Heller further argues that prioritising 
the prosecution of torture, even when there is no great number of victims, would 
increase the expressive function of prosecution, and thus the deterrent effect of 
the Court.151 
 Such a switch to the qualitative is relevant here. It contains the potential to 
address the inhumane treatment of asylum seekers; more importantly, it requires 
the Prosecutor to confront structural forms of violence that political systems 
generate.152 It allows ICL, and the ICC specifically, to address varieties of evil 
and of criminality, not purely of the spectacular or radical kind, necessitating 
sadistic violence. For torture is not necessarily wielded by sadistic individuals or 
totalitarian regimes bent on the extermination of their own populations. It has 
often been the by-product of the work of well-intentioned security officials, 
whose only stated objective was to protect their fellow citizens from a perceived 
terrorist threat.153 Today, the threat of unauthorised immigration generates 
inhuman and degrading treatment that can easily become accepted as a way to 
protect the state. Banal crimes are often the most widely committed — far more 
states mistreat refugees than engage in mass atrocity. Moreover, the banal crimes 
are the kinds of crimes that Western states may be as likely to commit as states in 
the Global South: another case in point is Australia’s extraterritorial treatment of 
asylum seekers in facilities such as those on Manus Island. 
But simply moving from a quantitative orientation of gravity to a qualitative 
one may not be enough. ‘Banal’ crimes against humanity seemingly raise an 
interesting paradox. If, as we argue, they may pass the threshold of gravity 
required in order to trigger an investigation by the OTP, how can they pass as 
‘banal’? Why do they lack the shock value characteristic of international crimes? 
From one perspective, the idea that an act can seem ‘grave’ and ‘banal’ in one 
and the same time may even seem self-contradictory. 
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The fact that acts that fall under the Rome Statute and the ICC’s mandate may 
not even register as international crimes is paradigmatic of the crimes we are 
thinking about. These are acts that aim to preserve the national interests of states 
that are largely considered democratic, legitimate and at the very centre of the 
‘we’ of the ‘international community’.154 However, this legitimacy may look 
quite different when considered from the perspective of the ramifications of 
global inequality reflected in such crimes. It is from this global perspective that 
the OTP must look at the world. Indeed, this perspective is codified in Rome 
Statute art 5, which mandates the ICC Prosecutor to ask which crimes are ‘of 
concern to the international community as a whole’.155 That a certain set of 
circumstances normally cannot even be seen from the perspective of its victims 
is in fact one of the hallmarks of the gravity of ‘banal’ acts. They are grave 
because the current world order somehow conceals their adverse consequences 
on the populations they target, not despite that fact. 
Moreover, the notion of gravity we argue for allows the ICC to realise a broad 
notion of complementarity. The Prosecutor does not only have to carry out a 
preconceived notion of gravity, based on a seeming global consensus. The 
Prosecutor must also question that consensus, constantly asking how that 
consensus might itself be an instrument of subjugation of particular populations. 
ICL, in this view, is one of various legal instruments designed to counter such 
subjugation when it is systematised. This may seem like a difficult, indeed 
‘Herculean’ task (to use Ronald Dworkin’s term).156 However, the only other 
option is a self-serving, uncritical notion of ‘gravity’, based upon the doxa held 
by a particular culture prevalent in relatively strong societies. Such a view will 
continue to erode the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of some. 
Complementarity, in our view, does not only mean that the Court steps in 
when a state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to carry out its own prosecution, as ICL 
doctrine ordinarily has it. It also realises an older tradition in international law, 
according to which international organisations step in to protect populations that 
no state grants protection to. This tradition has been prevalent in international 
law at least since the establishment of refugee protection organisations in the 
interwar period.157 This notion of complementarity may continue the gradual 
expansion of ICL since its inception with the Nuremberg trials. The gradual 
expansion has, throughout its history, often impinged on the interests of states.158 
This time, the interests of relatively strong states and organisations — not only 
Greece but also EU member states and specialised agencies — are in question. 
In order to embody such a notion of complementarity, the ICC Prosecutor’s 
judgement must take into account the desired political role of the ICC. The 
Prosecutor must prevent the possibility that international criminal prosecution 
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will become a mode of domination of the rich and powerful against the poor and 
weak.159 
V CONCLUSION 
There is significant evidence that crimes against humanity, which the ICC 
Prosecutor has the mandate to investigate, have been taking place at the  
south-eastern corner of Europe. Article 5 of the Rome Statute presents perhaps 
the most important question about these alleged crimes: are they ‘of concern to 
the international community as a whole’? 
In order to confront this thorny question, we have argued, one must recognise 
a previously unacknowledged, qualitative, concept of ‘gravity’. The label of 
banal crimes against humanity was our attempt to capture this concept and 
explain it. And the particular context of Greece (which is by no means a unique 
one around the world) illustrated the blind spot — both doctrinal and policy 
based — concerning such banal crimes. In future work, we hope to further 
interrogate this blind spot, which in our view is potentially crucial both in 
understanding and in practicing ICL. 
In order to engage the blind spot of banal crimes, the Prosecutor should look 
beyond the imagination of radical evil for future prosecutions. To this end, we 
have shown that the Prosecutor already possesses the necessary doctrinal tools to 
refocus ICL from its narrow attention on the developing world to a genuinely 
universal scope, carefully considering even normalised grievances rooted in the 
social and economic inequalities of the international system. 
It is not at all clear to us that the ICC can tackle banal crimes against 
humanity without taking on some measure of institutional risk. Investigating 
crimes whose perpetrators may be powerful traditional supporters of the Court 
(such as EU actors) may imperil such support.160 But without taking such risks, 
the ICC may lose its most basic justification. Only by going beyond radical evil 
can the Prosecutor approach the regulative ideal embedded in the phrase: ‘of 
concern to the international community as a whole’.161 
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